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Abstract

ABSTRACT
This paper examines the valuation effects of earnings and book values on security prices
of the airline companies under two different market structures: the regulated and the deregulated
periods. In regulated markets, and under the cost recovery plus adequate rate of return on assets,
security prices are highly aligned with book values of the respective companies. In the airline
industry, regulation took the form of guaranteed routes and of subsidies to service rural areas. In
addition, many airlines provide international service which was not subject to US regulations.
These features give rise to the differential effect of both book values and earnings. In deregulated
times, airline firms operate in highly competitive markets with large airline firms enjoying the
benefits of economy of scale and service diversification. Thus, both the asset capitalization (book
value) and operational efficiencies (earnings) would be major indicators in the market
assessment of the firm’s future profitability and security price. The literature lacks empirical
evidence in examining the relative importance of earnings and book values in regulated and
deregulated markets, especially in an airline industry. This paper aims at extending the literature
examining the valuation relevance of earnings and book value in the assessment of security
prices in the airline industry. The empirical results of this paper support the predictions of
differential impact of earnings and book value in explaining security prices of the airline firms in
both economic structures.

i

Introduction

I. INTRODUCTION
Investors use accounting reports and disclosures, among other publicly available
information, to assess the risk and valuation of firms. Prior research has indicated that the value
relevance of specific accounting information may vary depending upon the nature of its industry.
For example, regulated industries do not exhibit the same reaction to earnings announcements as
do nonregulated ones (Teets 1992). The operating risk of a firm in a regulated industry is
reduced compared to those in nonregulated industries and its expectations of earnings and
forecasts are more stable and predictable.
The airline industry was regulated through guaranteed routes and fares until 1976 when
the Civil Aeronautics Board began to voluntarily relax its control over the industry until it
subsequently ended (regulation) with the passage of the Airline Deregulation Act (1978). The
emergence of this industry from regulation to nonregulation provides a unique opportunity to test
the value relevance of accounting information with a more accurate testing of firms in two
different economies than does prior research (which uses random samples of nonregulated firms
to assess the differential effect of accounting information). This paper will examine the
changing value relevance of book value and earnings announcements as the industry transforms
itself from regulated to nonregulated.
II. PRIOR RESEARCH
Firms in regulated industries generally enjoy rates that ensure achieving a “normal” rate
of return (ROR) on their net assets based on an appropriate cost of capital. They enjoy some
degree of certainty because of guaranteed markets and rates of return. As a result, a regulated
firm’s operating risk would normally be lower than that of a firm in a nonregulated industry.
Teets (1992) compares the earnings response coefficients (ERC’s) for electric utilities with a
random sample of nonregulated firms drawn from a sample of firms identified by Brown,
Hagerman, Griffin, and Zmijewski (1987). He finds that the ERC for the utilities are more tightly
clustered than for nonregulated firms and have a much smaller average ERC than for
nonregulated firms. This result is consistent with the notion that the effects of unexpected
earnings are less permanent for utilities.
Nwaeke (1998) studied the relative contribution of income statement items to the
valuation of electric utilities using a matched sample (by size) of manufacturing firms to
highlight the effect of regulation. Among his findings are: 1) there is considerable alignment
between market value and book value for electric utilities, 2) the contribution of earnings levels
in explaining market value diminishes markedly in the presence of book values for electric
utilities, whereas, 3) earnings levels compliment book values in explaining market valuation of
manufacturing firms, and 4) earnings change compliments earnings levels in explaining market
values of manufacturing firms. Therefore, balance sheet book value is more closely aligned with
utilities than with manufacturing firms, whereas earnings levels and earning changes are
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important in explaining the market value of manufacturing firms. These results are explained by
the fact that in regulated industries, rates of return and guaranteed markets are assured.
Interstate trucking is another industry that transformed itself from regulation to
deregulation. Schipper, Thompson, and Weil, (1987) studied the effects of regulatory changes on
shareholder wealth as a result of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, which had the effect of making
truck-operating rights easier to secure and thereby allowed entry into new markets. The Act also
affected the rate setting practices of the past. Their study demonstrated that several of the
regulatory changes made prior to enactment of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 resulted in
negative share price reactions and reduced shareholder wealth, owing to fear that deregulation
would result in increased competition in both routes and pricing.
The airline industry was, until 1978, a regulated industry where both airline prices and
airline routes were subject to approval of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB). The first signs of
congressional interest in deregulating the airline industry began in 1970. Reaction to attempts at
deregulation of the airline industry was generally greeted negatively by most airlines. Predictions
of adverse consequences of deregulation included the creation of inefficiencies as new and
inexperienced airlines entered the field. This created excess capacity leading to increased costs,
heightened price competition, and decreased profitability. This was particularly true of the small
and weaker airlines, which were concerned, once the industry was deregulated, about their ability
to compete on price and routes with the larger, more financially able firms.
Events and hearings on deregulating the industry continued for eight years and through
two political administrations before the Airline Deregulation Act was signed on October 10,
1978. Industry profits at the time deregulation became law were approximately $1.4 billion and
tumbled to a loss of approximately $225 million in 1980 (Davidson, Chandy, and Walker 1984).
The immediate post deregulation period was also characterized by an increase in capacity that
peaked in the early 1980s. The resultant overcapacity and financial losses led to a period of
active merger activity (Kyle, Strickland, and Fayissa 1992). Between 1985 – 1987, in an attempt
to restructure the airline industry, 14 mergers of airlines were completed. This extensive merger
activity resulted in positive abnormal returns for both the target (14.5%) and the bidding firm
(3.7%) over the three-day period surrounding the merger announcement date (Kyle, Strickland,
and Fayissa 1992).
The transformation of the airline industry from being regulated to unregulated provides a
unique setting to test hypotheses concerning the impact of earnings announcements on market
valuations in a specific industry. El-Gazzar, Sannella, and Shalaby (2003) tested the impact of
earnings announcements in three distinct economic environments as airlines go from regulation
to partial regulation (transition period) to full deregulation. Using both a revaluation index (RI)
and a standardized revaluation index (SRI) they concluded that earnings announcements do
contain information content during each period and that the relevance of accounting information
increases as the industry goes from regulation to deregulation. This supports the notion that in a
deregulated environment there is greater competition, resulting in more risk and uncertainty for
the investor in valuing securities. According to the authors, “earnings have more value relevance
in competitive markets than in regulated ones.”
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Banker, Das, & Ou (1995) used financial ratios to test various hypotheses about the
market responses to events leading up to airline deregulation. Their empirical results indicated
that operating performance is positively related to the market reaction to deregulation. Their
results also indicated that stronger airlines were more likely to benefit from deregulation, while
weaker ones were less likely. Investor expectations are more interested in operating efficiency
than financial health when entering a more competitive environment brought about by
deregulation.
Banker, Das, & Ou (1997) also sought to test the impact of deregulation from a
differential perspective. Airline firms were divided into trunk (generally large airlines that cater
to long distance lines serving large population centers) and local (smaller sized airlines serving
less populated and less traveled areas) to test whether similar reactions to deregulation occurred.
As deregulation became more imminent, local airlines experienced much larger percentage
increases (than did trunk airlines) in systematic risk than existed when deregulation was less
imminent; both groups displaying a negative reaction to deregulation. These studies indicate that
book value has more value relevance during periods of regulation and that earnings have more
value relevance during periods of deregulation. The transformation of the airline industry from
regulation to deregulation is a unique opportunity to provide a stronger test of this hypothesis.
III: DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES
Nature of the Airline Regulation
In a typical regulated industry such as utilities, the service is priced on cost plus a normal
rate of return on assets. Theoretically, this cost recovery plus the allowed rate of return would
lead to aligning the utilities’ book value with its market value. Accordingly, balance sheet
information (book value) would be superior to earnings in explaining security prices. However,
achieving a pure cost recovery plus normal rate of return is constrained by the frequency of
reviewing the allowed rate of return and by management’s discretion in accounting for many
balance sheet assets, resulting in prices charged to generate profits over (or below) the allowed
rate of return (Nwaeze 1998 and Sherman 1989). In this condition, earnings should complement
book value in explaining the market value.
The airline industry regulation differs from the typical cost recovery pricing models of
the utilities. The airline regulation was a mix of guaranteed routes and financial subsidies to
provide air travel service for rural locations. In addition, many US airline companies were also
operating on international routes which are subject to extensive competition. These regulation
features make the inference of the relative valuation power of earnings and book value mixed.
On the other hand, deregulation of the industry provided a competitive market where large
airline companies enjoy the benefits of economy of scale and diversification in operations
between national and international flights, giving rise, again, to the expectation that explanatory
power of book value is greater than earnings.
Based on the above arguments, the following hypotheses are tested:
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H01:

There is a higher correlation between book value and prices than earnings and prices
during the regulation period.

H02:

The operating risk of firms in the airline industry is lower in regulated than in
deregulated times.

H03: There is a higher association between earnings and security prices than book value and
security prices in the deregulated period.
IV. RESEARCH DESIGN
Sample
We began our sample selection by retrieving all the firms in the Scheduled Air
Transportation industry, SIC=4512, from the 2005 edition of the S&P Annual COMPUSTAT.
We required that firms have valid data for key variables in years between 1970 and 1984 and are
incorporated in the US. We found a total of 52 firms with 370 firm-year observations.
Since our test relies on a between-sample comparison among regulated (1970 – 1975)
and deregulated (1979 – 1984) periods, we required that each period is well represented by all
sample firms. Firms that appear in only one sample period but not in the other were excluded.
This requirement reduced our sample to 23 firms and 231 firm-year observations. This base
sample was used for our empirical tests. To control for the potential bias of repeated firms in the
test years, we included a dummy variable for each firm and year tested. This dummy variable
takes the value of 1 if the observation is from a particular firm or year and 0 otherwise.
Statistically, this is equivalent to the Generalized Least Squares (GLS) model with fixed effect
components.
To increase the reliability of the inferences from the analysis of empirical results, we
constructed a control sample from the manufacturing sector and ran the same tests during the two
economic periods. This control sample was randomly selected from the total population of the
manufacturing industries with SIC codes from 3000 to 3999, taking into consideration the
proportionate size of the population (Palepu 1989).
Model
Studies testing the valuation effects of accounting information have been using the
association between the different accounting metrics such as earnings per share, cash flow from
operations, and the book value as evidence of the value relevance of accounting information.
This approach is known as level tests (Beaver 2002). However, other researchers (e.g., Easton
1999) argued that level tests suffer from aggregation and lack of direct attribution. Specifically,
they argued that higher association between accounting metrics and security prices can be a
result of both accounting measures and security prices being highly correlated with other market
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or economic drivers; therefore, results from level tests should be subject to additional analysis
for reliable inferences.
In this paper, we use both level and change tests. Change tests examine the relationship
between changes in prices and changes in the specific accounting metric under investigation.
Some researchers argue that combining the two models into one may produce a complementary
explanation for the effect of accounting numbers on market valuation (Nwaeze 1998).
Time Span of the Study
This study examines the valuation effects of the earnings and book value on airlines’
security prices in two distinctive economic environments: regulation and deregulation
(competition). Although the deregulation act was signed in 1978, the Civil Aeronautics Board
began to voluntarily relax its control over the industry in 1976. Therefore, the time coverage in
the study is partitioned into three sub-periods: regulated, transition, and deregulated periods.
Since the research compares the role of earnings and book value in the regulated versus
deregulated environment of the airline industry, no specific tests were conducted for the
transition period.
Regulated Economy
Transition Economy
Deregulated Economy
1970 – 1975
1976-1978
1979- 1984
The following models were tested in this paper in each of the three economic settings above:
(1)
PRCj = aj + b1(BVj) + ej
PRCj = aj + b1(EPSj) + ej
(2)
PRCj = aj + b1(BVj) + b2(EPSj) + ej
(3)
Where:
PRCj : market price of security j on closing day of the firm’s fiscal year end adjusted
for stock splits;
BVj

: book

value per share of firm j adjusted for stock splits;

EPSj

: annual earnings per share of firm j adjusted for stock splits;
V: ANALYSIS OF RESULTS

Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of performance and operating measures of sample
firms. Panel A of Table 1 presents the statistics of the airline sample, while Panel B presents
those of the manufacturing sample. The statistics demonstrate major differences in the variables
in two dimensions: a) across the two test periods among the airline companies, and b) between
the airline companies and the control manufacturing sample. For instance, the sales to total assets
ratio improved from 0.9813 in the regulation period to 1.1621 in the deregulation period. This
improvement suggests that as the airline industry became competitive, management devoted
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more efforts to survive competition, and increased the volume of operations. However, income
before interest and taxes (IBIT) significantly decreased from .0722 in the regulated economy to
0.0501 in the deregulated market. The two observations taken together suggest that, as the airline
industry deregulated, increased competition led to increased volume but at a competitive pricing,
causing the profit margin and earnings to be lower. Similarly, interest coverage as a measure of
liquidity is significantly lower in the deregulated period as compared to the regulated times.
These findings are consistent with prior research reporting that the post regulation period was
characterized by higher competition and lower profitability compared to regulated times
(Davidson et al. 1984; Banker et al. 1997).
TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics of the Airline Sample and the Control Industrial Sample During the
Regulated and Deregulated Periods
Regulated Period
1970-75
Mean

Deregulated Period
1979-84

Median

Mean

Median

Panel A: Airline Sample
Number of Firms

23

23

Total Firm-year Observations

124

107

Total Sales ($mil.)

465

271

1684

1110

Total Assets ($mil.)

574

299

1472

1027

Total Market Value ($mil.)

191

68

321

153

EBIT on Sales

0.0722

0.0655

0.0501

0.0525

Market to Book Ratio

0.5969

1.0797

1.7916

0.9048

Earnings to Price Ratio

0.0454

0.0487

-0.1717

0.0480

Sales to Total Assets

0.9813

0.9418

1.1621

1.1864

CAPM Beta

1.6985

1.6841

1.1547

1.1168

Standard Dev. Of Stock Price

0.0338

0.0346

0.0311

0.0314

Capital Expenditure on Sales

0.1646

0.0961

0.1723

0.1327

Advertising Expense on Sales

0.0195

0.0180

0.0179

0.0183

Debt to Asset Ratio

0.4916

0.5127

0.4557

0.4676

Interest Coverage Ratio

1.9864

1.6414

1.6589

1.2673

Altman’s Z-Score

1.6818

2.0965

2.5045

2.0071

Panel B: Manufacturing Sample
Number of Firms

871

871

Total Firm-year Observations

4253

4217

Total Sales ($mil.)

373

67

787

132

Total Assets ($mil.)

293

47

585

97

Total Market Value ($mil.)

203

24

336

62
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EBIT on Sales

0.0957

0.0896

0.0861

0.0935

Market to Book Ratio

1.4141

0.9268

1.4606

1.1553

Earnings to Price Ratio

0.1065

0.0922

0.0942

0.0925

Sales to Total Assets

1.3780

1.3431

1.4232

1.3903

CAPM Beta

1.0882

1.0674

0.9908

0.9679

Standard Dev. Of Stock Price

0.0310

0.0278

0.0257

0.0238

Capital Expenditure on Sales

0.0554

0.0386

0.0642

0.0443

Advertising Expense on Sales

0.0176

0.0115

0.0211

0.0143

Debt to Asset Ratio

0.2399

0.2398

0.2078

0.1991

Interest Coverage Ratio

28.692

6.1258

21.343

5.5132

Altman’s Z-Score

3.4026

3.2314

3.5099

3.4793

Note:
This table provides descriptive statistics for the sample of firm year observations used in the
study. We began our sample selection by retrieving all the firms in the Scheduled Air Transportation
industry, SIC=4512, from the 2005 edition of the S&P Annual COMPUSTAT. We required that firms
have valid data for key variables in years between 1970 and 1984 and are incorporated in the US.
We found a total of 52 firms with 370 firm-year observations. Since our test relies on betweensample comparison among regulated (1970 – 1975 and deregulated (1979 – 1984) periods, we required that
each period is well represented by all sample firms. Firms that appear in only one or two sample periods
but not the other are excluded. This requirement reduces our sample to 23 firms and 297 firm-year
observations. Following Altman (1968), the Z-score equals 1.2(Net working capital/total assets) +
1.4(Retained earnings/Total assets) + 3.3(Earnings before interest and taxes/Total assets) + 0.6(market
value of equity/Book value of liabilities) + 1.0(Sales/Total assets). Lower Altman’s Z-score indicates
poorer financial health.

Contrasting the statistics of the airline firms with those of the manufacturing firms in
Panel B of Table 1, one observes a significant demarcation among the two samples in the test
periods. Manufacturing companies tend to have higher and more stable measures of performance
and operations in the two test periods than the airline companies. For instance, manufacturing
companies have on average a ratio of sales to total assets of 1.4, which is significantly higher
than the airline companies’ ratio of 1.1 and relatively stable over the three test periods. The
earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) ratio shows that manufacturing companies are on
average more profitable than the airline companies in all test periods. Similarly, manufacturing
companies have interest coverage ratios of 28.692 and 21.343 during the two test periods,
respectively, while the airline sample has average interest coverage ratios of 1.98 and 1.65 for
the same two test periods respectively. This suggests that airline companies suffer greater
liquidity problems than do manufacturing firms. The Altman’s Z-Score for manufacturing firms
is around 3.5 for the test periods compared to 2.0 for airlines during the same test periods,
suggesting that the airline companies have higher probability of financial distress (and
ultimately) bankruptcy than their counterparts in the manufacturing sector.
Regression Results
To test the relative importance of earnings and book values in the valuation of equity
securities of the airline firms in the regulated and competitive market settings, we regress the
security prices of firms at the end of the fiscal year on both the book value and earnings of
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sample firms. Table 2 presents the regression coefficients of earnings and book values. Panel A
of Table 2 presents the coefficient estimates for the airline firms in the two time periods
(regulated 1970-1975) and deregulated (1979-1984), while Panel B presents the coefficient
estimates for the control/ manufacturing firms during the same test periods.
TABLE 2
Coefficient Estimates of Regressing Stock Price on Book Value and Earnings in the Two Economies
(Regulated 1970-1975 and Deregulated 1979-1984)
Panel A: Airline Industry (SIC 4512)
Independent
Variables

Predicted
Sign

Intercept
BVPS

+

EPS

+

Firm Fixed-effect
Year Fixed-effect
Number of Observations
Adj. R-squared

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

1970-75

1979-84

1970-75

1979-84

1970-75

1979-84

0.2360
(0.4548)

-0.0861
(0.6521)

-0.4055
(0.0750)

-0.9453
(0.0001)

0.2416
(0.4422)

-0.3558
(0.0946)

0.6597
(0.0004)

0.8847
(0.0001)

0.5589
(0.0051)

0.6863
(0.0001)

0.1805
(0.0122)

0.4154
(0.0001)

0.0994
(0.1807)

0.1812
(0.0105)

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

124
0.8188

107
0.8440

124
0.8067

107
0.7995

124
0.8204

107
0.8549

Panel B: Manufacturing Industry (SIC between 3000 – 3999)
Intercept
BVPS

+

EPS

+

Firm Fixed-effect
Year Fixed-effect
Number of Observations
Adj. R-squared

0.3104
(0.5083)

-0.2062
(0.4896)

-0.1063
(0.8186)

0.8244
(<0.0001)

0.7394
(<0.0001)

-0.5748
(0.0524)

0.2492
(0.5785)

-0.2844
(0.3054)

0.5109
(<0.0001)

0.5216
(<.0001)

0.3878
(<0.0001)

0.3875
(<.0001)

0.2659
(<0.0001)

0.2808
(<0.0001)

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

4,253
0.7813

4,217
0.8226

4,253
0.7861

4,217
0.8248

4,253
0.8002

4,217
0.8466

Note:
The first number in each cell is the parameter estimate and the second number is the p-value which indicates the
significance level. The p-value is based on the t-test with White (1980) heteroskedasticity corrected standard error. All
variables are standardized by subtracting the sample mean and dividing by the standard deviation. The standardized
variables have means equal to 0 and standard deviations equal to 1. To control for the potential of a repeated sample effect,
we included firm dummy variables and year dummy variables in all regressions. Statistically, this is equivalent to the
Generalized Least Square (GLS) model with fixed-effect components. These dummy variables take value 1 if the
observation is from a particular firm or year and 0 otherwise. All models are estimated with these dummy variables but the
parameters of these dummies are omitted from the table.
Variable definition: BVPS – Total common equity divided by common shares outstanding;
EPS – Basic earnings per share before extraordinary items.
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The Airline Firms
From Panel A of Table 2, Model 1 examines the correlation between prices and book
values per share during the two test periods: the regulated period (1970-1975), and the
deregulated period (1979-1984). The coefficient of the book value per share (BVPS) is positive
(0.6597) and significant (p < 0.0004) during the regulated period, confirming the prediction.
During the deregulated period, the book value per share has a stronger relationship with security
prices (BVPS 0.8847 and p< 0.0001). The results of Model 1 for the airline industry confirms
the importance of book value in explaining security prices in both economies, regulated and
deregulated.
Model 2 of Panel A reports the coefficient estimates of the effect of earnings per share
(EPS) on security prices during the two test periods. Earnings per share have a positive and
significant coefficient during both the regulated and deregulated periods, with higher impact
during the deregulated period (0.1805 and p<0.0122 and 0.4154 with p<0.0001, respectively).
These results suggest that earnings have lower loading and importance on prices during regulated
periods compared to deregulated times. These results are consistent with the predictions stated
earlier.
Model 3 combines both book values and earnings as explanatory variables for prices. The
results are consistent with the hypothesis that BVPS has a stronger relation with prices during
regulated times, while earnings have an insignificant impact on prices. Although BVPS still
holds a significant correlation with prices during the deregulated period, EPS also has a
significant impact in explaining prices. The results of Model 3 suggest that in competitive
markets earnings complement book values in explaining prices and are consistent with prior
research ( Nwaeze 1998).
The Manufacturing Firms
Panel B of Table 2 presents regression coefficient estimates of the relationship between
both earnings and book value and security prices for the control sample of manufacturing firms.
The coefficients of both earnings and the book value per share are positive and significant under
each of the model specifications and periods of tests. The inclusion of both book value and
earnings per share in Model 3 increased the explanatory power of the model and R-squared is the
highest in the three periods compared to those of Model 1 and Model 2, where BVPS and EPS
are introduced one at a time. These results confirm prior research that book value and earnings
individually have significant association with security prices, and that earnings (book value)
complement book value (earnings) in explaining security behavior.
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VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Prior research argues (and finds support) that in traditional regulated industries such as
utilities and transportation, the pricing of the service guarantees a fair rate of return on invested
capital. In theory, this pricing policy would lead to an alignment of the book value with market
value of the firm. Extending this inference to the period of airline regulation is not straight
forward. The regulation of the airline industry was mainly in guaranteed routes and price
subsidies. This paper examines whether earnings and book values have the differential
explanatory power of security prices in the airline industry depending on the economic sittings:
regulated versus competitive markets. Our results show that earnings have a complementary
explanatory power to the book values in explaining security prices of the airline firms, with a
higher effect in the deregulated test period.
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